Is time travel into the past metaphysically possible
Title: Is time travel into the past metaphysically possible
Is time travel into the past metaphysically possible? Time travel into the past is a popular topic in science fiction and has captured the imagination of people for many years. However, the question of whether it is metaphysically possible is a complex one that is still debated among philosophers and scientists. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of reality and the fundamental structure of the universe. In this sense, time travel into the past is a metaphysical question because it touches upon the nature of time and the possibility of changing the past. One popular philosophical view on time is presentism, which states that only the present exists and the past and future are merely mental constructions. If this view is true, then time travel into the past would be impossible because there is no past to travel to. The present is constantly changing and once it has passed, it is no longer real. Another philosophical view on time is eternalism, which states that all times, past, present, and future, exist equally and simultaneously. According to this view, time is a four-dimensional space-time and the past, present, and future are just different parts of this space. If this view is true, time travel into the past could be possible, but only in a theoretical sense. However, the question of whether it is possible to actually change the past remains unanswered. In the realm of physics, the theory of general relativity provides a framework for understanding the nature of time and space. According to this theory, time is not a fixed and universal concept, but is relative to the observer and can be affected by gravity. However, general relativity does not allow for time travel into the past because it does not allow for the existence of closed time-like curves, which would allow an object or a person to travel back in time. Another aspect of the physics of time travel is the issue of causality, which states that the cause must come before the effect. If time travels into the past were possible, it would violate the principle of causality and lead to the possibility of a paradox. For example, if a person were to travel back in time and prevent their own birth, then they would never have existed to make the trip back in time in the first place. This paradox is known as the "grandfather paradox." The concept of parallel universes, also known as the many-worlds interpretation, provides another perspective on the possibility of time travel into the past. According to this theory, every possible outcome of a given event branches off into a separate universe, creating an infinite number of parallel universes. If this theory is true, then time travel into the past could be possible within a separate universe, but would not affect the original universe. In conclusion, the question of whether time travels into the past is metaphysically possible is still a matter of debate among philosophers and scientists. While some philosophical views suggest that it is possible, the laws of physics and the principle of causality appear to contradict the idea. The concept of parallel universes provides a possible solution to the paradoxes that arise from the idea of time travel into the past, but it remains a theoretical concept. Until there is a clearer understanding of the nature of time and the structure of the universe, the question of whether time travels into the past is metaphysically possible will remain unanswered. Philosophy Essay Advice: Make your writing as clear as you can. The idea is to make it so clear that the reader requires no effort to understand it, and no misunderstanding is possible. You can’t be too clear. This is my number-one tip (along with answering the question--see below). Lack of clarity is the most common and the most serious flaw in student writing, and being clear is the most important thing you can do to improve it. The murkier your essay, the harder it will be for you to see whether it’s plausible, well-argued, coherent, or relevant. Unclear writing is also a symptom of unclear thinking: if you have trouble saying something clearly, it’s usually because you don’t fully understand it. (This applies to professionals as well as students.) The ability to express difficult things clearly is one of the most valuable ‘transferable skills’ that a Philosophy degree can give you, and employers rate it highly. Don’t make the essay too sophisticated or complex. Students have a natural tendency to try to run before they can walk. Slow down and be patient. It’s much better to make simple points well than complicated points badly. Think for yourself, but don’t worry too much about whether you’re being original enough. No one expects undergraduates to come up with good ideas that they haven’t encountered in their reading or lectures (though it does happen!). There’s plenty of room for originality in stating familiar points in your own words. If you have got an original thought--something you haven’t heard in lectures or read about--be cautious. Make it as clear as you can. Don’t rely on it. Make sure your essay has other points in case your original idea turns out to be badly confused, or if the examiner can see that it’s obviously wrong. If you have serious doubts, leave it out- -or, better, discuss it with the lecturer before deciding. Use plain English. Don’t use fancy words or complex sentence structures just for the sake of it. No one will be impressed. It will only make your essay harder to understand. Illustrating an abstract point with a vivid example can help both you and the reader to understand it. Don’t repeat yourself unnecessarily. Lengthy introductory or concluding paragraphs that merely repeat what you say elsewhere is worse than useless: they waste words and present an obstacle to the reader. Always ask yourself: will this introductory or concluding bit make it easier for the reader to understand the main body of the essay? If the answer is not obviously Yes, think again. You don’t need a strong conclusion. You may find, on reflection, that the answer to the question set is not at all obvious--perhaps because the arguments on either side are about equal, or because there is more than one thing that the question can reasonably be taken to mean. In that case, this is the conclusion you should report. Say what you think the arguments show, even if you think it’s little or nothing, and explain why. Unless you are a celebrity, your opinion counts for nothing. All that matters are the reasons you can give for it--reasons that readers can find forceful. Other things equal, essays near the maximum word limit are better than those well below it. But don’t repeat yourself or say something irrelevant just to pad out the essay. And don’t exceed the word limit. Strategy: Answer the question--all parts of it. Better, make sure every part of the essay contributes towards answering it. Resist the temptation to go beyond the question. If you think you can answer the question in a single paragraph, you’ve gone wrong. Many essay questions ask for a mixture of exposition and discussion: e.g. ‘State and evaluate X’s argument for the claim that P’. Don’t skimp on the exposition. Exposition is the foundation of your essay: get it wrong and everything else will be out of alignment. If the point to be discussed is not clear, you’re far more likely to stray from the topic and waste space with points not directly relevant. And you won’t know where to aim your critical discussion. The result is inevitably a lengthy essay somewhere in the vicinity of the question set. It’s perfectly reasonable to use half the essay or more setting out the target, before making any critical remarks. The clearer you make the point to be discussed, the easier it will be to know what to say about it. A common mistake is to sketch the target only very roughly, in a paragraph. The result is usually that it’s hard to tell whether the objections hit the target. Students err far more often on too little exposition than on too much. Think of the old soldiers’ advice: Don’t shoot till you can see the whites of their eyes. (But expound only on the claim or argument that you are going to write about.) Don’t try to squeeze too much in. It’s far better to make fewer points in-depth than more points superficially. Use technical or contested terms only if there’s a strong reason for it. And be sure to explain what you mean by them. This includes any term that could mean different things in the context, or whose meaning is not clear to the general public: e.g. ‘foundationalism’, ‘substance’, ‘dualism’, ‘materialism’, ‘rationalism’ ‘supervenience’, and ‘self’. Say as much about their meaning as the reader needs in order to understand the essay and no more. If you’re unsure whether you need to explain a term, try to recall whether your lecturer explained it. If so, do likewise. (And be sure you get it right!) Proofread your essay carefully. Don’t just use a spellchecker. Make an effort to get the grammar and punctuation exactly right, just as you would if you were writing a job application. If need be, get a friend to check it. Reading List:
- Introduction: The nature of metaphysics
- W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics (CUP 1984), Introduction. M. Loux, Metaphysics (Routledge 1998), Introduction. E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (OUP 2002), Introduction. G. Schlesinger, Metaphysics (Blackwell 1983), ch. 1. P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008.
- Do we have a soul?
- Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §§1-5. (on Blackboard) R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (2e, OUP 1997), Introduction (pp. 1-16). P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics (4e, Westview 2014), pp. 223-230.
- Hawthorne, Cartesian dualism, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Persons: Human and Divine (OUP 2007), 87-98.
- Taylor, Metaphysics, 4e (Prentice Hall 1992), ch. 2.
- Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §6. A. Segal, A sane soul-hypothesis and the sane materialist alternative, §2 E. Olson, The appearance and the evidence, §1. D. Bell, Husserl (Routledge 1990), ‘Conscious bodies’, pp. 162-168 (208-214 in the print
- Plantinga, Materialism and Christian belief, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman , eds., Persons: Human and Divine (OUP 2007), Part 1 (pp. 99-118)
- van Inwagen, Metaphysics, pp. 230-245. E. Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §§7, 8 A. Segal, A sane soul-hypothesis and the sane materialist alternative, §§5-7. J. Foster, The Immaterial Self (Routledge 1991), pp. 202-212.
- Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, ch. 8. B. Williams, Descartes (Penguin 1978), ch. 4. D. Zimmerman, Two Cartesian arguments for the simplicity of the soul. American
- Segal, Why I believe I am a soul, §§8-17. E. Olson, Fuzzy edges and amputations.A. Segal, Materialism is metaphysically messy or morally absurd. E. Olson, The Paradox of Increase. Monist 89 (2006): 390-417.
- van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell 1990), §§2, 3, 8, 9.
- Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §§10-16. A. Segal, A sane soul-hypothesis and the sane materialist alternative, §§3-8 further reading D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 2e (Blackwell 2007), ch. 1. P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics, pp. 260-265. P. Smith and O. R. Jones, The Philosophy of Mind (CUP 1986), ch. 4, ‘Difficulties for
- Time
- Dyke. 2011. Metaphysics of time. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. R. LePoidevin. 2003. Travels in Four Dimensions (OUP 2003), ch. 8, Does Time Pass? A. N. Prior, Changes in events and changes in things, in his Papers on Time and Tense
- M. E. McTaggart, The unreality of time, in R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., The Philosophy of Time, OUP 1993, 23-34 (original work 1927). Also reprinted as ‘Time: an excerpt from The Nature of Existence’ in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2e, Blackwell 2008.
- Taylor, Fate (ch. 6 of Metaphysics, 4e, Prentice Hall 1992, 54-67).
- Ryle, It was to be, in his Dilemmas (CUP 1954) Seddon, Time, 105-133. van Inwagen, What does an omniscient being know about the future? In J. Kvanvig,
- Hare, Time--Emotional asymmetry. In H. Dyke and A. Bardon, eds., A Companion
- Lewis, The paradoxes of time travel, American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 145-152.
- J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics, OUP 2002, ch. 18. D. H. Mellor, Real Time II, ch. 12 van Inwagen, Changing the past, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5 (2010).
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